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ATTACHMENT I 
ILLUSTRATIVE ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED OYU TOLGOI MINING CONTRACT 
 
I. Introduction 
The Hural and all Mongolians should perform some analysis of the financial aspects 
of the proposed Oyu Tolgoi mining contract in order to gain an understanding of the 
gains and losses of the contract relative to other options, the effect of relevant economic 
variables on the returns to Mongolia and to the investor and how risks might affect those 
returns. 
Some analysis is provided here in order to illustrate the type of work that is 
necessary for making informed decisions.  The analysis is illustrative because results 
are based on a number of assumptions and data publicly available (see assumptions).  
Some emphasis is placed on the assumptions and data limitations because it is 
important for the Hural and all Mongolians to request that such data be provided by the 
government (as well as any analysis conducted by the government) so that there is a 
basis for common understanding. 
Despite the illustrative nature of the analysis, a number of important issues are 
raised; issues that should be addressed before even an informed discussion can take 
place, much less a reasonable decision.  These issues include: 
1. Clarification of how a number of computations will be made (the royalty for 
instance); 
 
2. Clarification of how the smelter and electricity options will affect the financial 
viability of the project from Mongolia’s and the investor’s point of view; 
 
3. How Mongolia will address the significant increase in mineral price risk it will  
bear because of the need to finance equity participation and to operate a smelter; 
 
4. What Mongolia’s capacity to monitor the process is and how Mongolia will ensure 
that any administrative capacity limitations are addressed; and 
 
5. What Mongolia’s options are with respect to other uses of funds that will be 
required to finance that equity participation. 
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II. Nature of the Analysis 
 
Suppose a person who owns five hectares of land is asked to evaluate the following 
proposal:  “Sell me your land and I will give you 100,000 Tugrugs plus 10% of the value 
of crop production for the next ten years.”  As stated, this proposal has little or no 
meaning and the person must have some context for deciding whether the proposal is a 
good deal.  That context is provided by: 
1. Listing alternatives (such as using the land for own production, selling the land 
for housing or leaving the land unproductive in hopes of future land price 
increases), 
 
2. Computing the monetary value of the income flows from the proposal and 
alternatives 
 
3. Computing the present value of the proposal and the alternatives, and 
 
4. Performing some sensitivity (or risk analysis) to gain some understanding of how 
the different economic factors affect the outcomes. 
One such analysis is provided for the Oyu Tolgoi deposit for illustrative purposes 
here.  In particular, 
1. The proposed contract is compared to one alternative:  use of the current legal 
framework, 
 
2. The monetary values for the mine to the investor and Mongolia are computed for 
the term of the contract, 
 
3. The present value of each option is computed, and 
 
4. Prices, debt structure and interest rates are used to illustrate how changes in 
these variables affect the size and ranking of the two alternatives.  
 
III. Assumptions 
 
a. The fiscal regime used for this analysis is provided in Table 1.  Current law 
and the proposed contract structure are compared.  Among the 
differences between the proposed contract and current law note is made 
of the requirement that Mongolia pay a share of any future capital 
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expenditure, the exemption from the windfall profits tax, the investment 
credit and the five year loss carry forwards. 
 
b. Table 2 contains the assumptions made in order to produce the illustrative 
results.  Note is made of the following factors 
 
i. Extraction and investment are based on the provisions in the 
proposed contract. 
 
ii. The term of the analysis is the term of the contract. 
 
iii. Costs and the structure of revenues are based on the Executive 
Summary provided by Ivanhoe in 2005. 
 
iv. It is assumed that the present value of the mine will not be affected 
by either how electricity is supplied or whether the smelter is built.  
In effect, pricing to the mine is assumed invariant to the source of 
ether electricity or the supply of smelting services. 
 
v. The present value of either a domestic smelter or expanded 
electricity production for supplying the mine is effectively zero.  That 
is, only the mine is being examined here.  A separate analysis is 
required to examine the effects of the smelter and any options for 
electricity supply. 
 
c. Three options are considered 
 
i. Current Law 
ii. The Proposed Contract 
iii. The Proposed Contract with the Windfall Profits Tax Imposed  
(Sales from the domestic smelter are exempt but exports of 
concentrate are taxed) 
 
 
IV. Base Case 
 
a. One case has been selected to represent the base case for the present 
analysis.  The following additional assumptions are used to compute the 
results for the base case: 
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i. Price of copper = 2.00 $US per pound 
ii. Price of gold = 500 $  per ounce 
iii. Interest Rate = 10% 
iv. Inflation Rate = 0% 
v. Debt Structure = 50% debt financed at 10% 
 
b. Results for the base case are contained in Table 3 
 
i. As shown the contract has almost no effect of the share of the 
present of the net present value to Mongolia retains relative to 
current established law, while retaining the Windfall Tax in the 
current contract shifts about 6% of the present value toward the 
Mongolia. 
 
ii. On average the investor’s return (measured as the internal rate of 
return) increases (from almost 40% to almost 54%) when the 
contract is applied, but the investor’s return is reduced to about 
42% when contract terms and the windfall tax are combined.1  This 
means that the timing of Mongolia’s cash flows, while higher, are 
shifted more toward the future.  This results because the windfall 
tax is not applied in the early years and the government has 
negative cash flows for some years because of the need to finance 
its share of the investment, among other reasons.  More cash later 
is more risky.  Thus, a tradeoff may have to be made about the 
amount of additional risk borne by Mongolia, other things equal.2 
                                               
1 A number of restrictive assumptions are necessary in order for the internal rate of return to have 
meaning as an investment decision tool.  In addition, the internal rate of return will not be unique for the 
current mine because of the cash flow structure.  What is reported above are the values computed by the 
computer program without searching for other solutions. While the internal rate of return has the serious 
limitations noted above, the implications for the timing of Mongolia’s payments are unambiguous.  Taxes 
with the windfall tax are delayed because all output in the early years will be exempt from the Windfall 
Tax if the smelter is built.  The results will be adverse for the investor if smelter construction is delayed. 
2 The internal rate of return can be computed for Mongolia with the contract because there are negative 
cash flows during the early project years to finance the 34% investment costs.  The value reported is 
significant being in excess of 76%.  Nothing should be made of this value, however. The reason is that 
the internal rate of return for the current law is infinite because the government never spends cash on the 
project (in a financial sense).  Thus, Mongolia’s internal rate of return has, in reality, fallen.  This is 
another reason why the internal rate of return is not an indicator of profitability.  (Note should be made of 
the fact that the opportunity cost of the reserves in the ground is being treated as zero in order to make 
the current absolute computations.  In reality Mongolia is forgoing significant value by devoting the 
reserves to this particular use.)  Some recognition of this opportunity cost would be necessary to provide 
a complete analysis.   
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c. On balance, Mongolia fairs better with the contract, given current 
assumptions.  Of course the probability is zero that this value will be 
realized.  Thus, it is important to provide more context by way of some 
sensitivity analysis. 
 
V. Some Analysis 
 
a. Overall Project 
 
Two experiments were conducted to determine lower bounds for the overall 
project, regardless of how the gains and losses are distributed.  This information is 
helpful because no party would invest in the project if these values were realized. 
 
i. Minimum Price 
 
One indicator of risk is to calculate the price that makes the present value of the 
project less than zero.  This value was computed to be about .42 $US maintaining all 
the other assumptions noted above.  This value is significantly less than the current spot 
price for refined copper but is within the range of possibility given the history of copper 
prices and the long term nature of the project.   
 
ii. Costs Rising Relative to Price 
 
General price inflation will not affect  the overall present value of the project.  
Changes in relative prices will affect the present value, however.  For instance, wages 
and other input costs rise in excess of the general inflation.3  Thus, it is of interest to ask 
what rate of relative cost increases will result in a negative present value?  This value 
was computed to be about 10.5% maintaining other assumptions.  The mine would 
close in about fifteen years with no changes in either the fiscal regime or the technology 
employed because costs would be perpetually greater than sales values. 
 
b. Comparative Analysis 
 
Some sensitivity analysis of three factors (price, financial structure and interest 
rates) is provided to illustrate how the relative ranking of the two alternatives (current 
law and proposed contract) might be affected.  Mongolia’s share of the present value is 
used as an indicator of relative value at each step.  The present value to be allocated 
                                                
3 An increases in the real wage is one indicator of positive economic growth 
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between the parties changes with changes in the values in questions.  Once the overall 
present value is computed, however, the proportion accruing to Mongolia will differ 
depending on the fiscal regime.  Thus, using Mongolia’s proportion of the present value 
is a reasonable indicator for the task at hand. 
 
i. Price Changes 
 
It has been established that neither party would invest in Oyu Tolgoi if copper 
prices are below .85 US dollars given current assumptions.  At prices above this value, 
Mongolia’s share of the present value under each regime increases with price.  To 
repeat, Mongolia gains relative to the investor when prices rise regardless of the fiscal 
regime.  In the case of current law, the government gets a greater proportion of revenue 
from the windfall tax as prices rise because costs do not vary for this tax.  Under the 
proposed contract or current law, the royalty and income tax increase Mongolia’s share.  
A 10% increase in output prices will increase taxable profits by more than 10% holding 
costs constant and thus the government will gain relative to the investor when prices 
rise. 
 
The relative behavior of the three options for price changes is reported in Figure 
1 and Table 4.  Either contract option is favored when prices are relatively low but that 
result is switched as prices increase.  The reason for this result is, in part, that Mongolia 
will accrue greater than proportional gains from high prices with the windfall tax relative 
to equity sharing under current law.  This benefit is mitigated in part by the contract with 
a continued windfall profits tax and completely with the windfall profits tax exemption. 
 
ii. Changes in Financial Structure 
 
The amount of debt will affect Mongolia’s returns in two ways.  First, interest 
expense is deducted from profits taxes.  Second, if the contract is adopted then 
Mongolia will have to finance less of the initial investment because loans will be made to 
the domestic company operating the mine.  This gain is offset by the requirement that 
interest and principal will have to be repaid at some later date.  In general, any investor 
would seek to finance with debt, however, as long as the cost of debt is less than the 
cost of equity (or own source) finance.  
 
The effect of changes in financial structure is reported in Figure 2 and Table 5.  
Mongolia’s share falls regardless of regime because of the reduction in profits tax. 
 
iii. Changes in the Discount Rate 
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Different investors will have different discount rates given their risk preferences, 
wealth and other factors.  The discount rate used to discount financial flows from 
Mongolia’s perspective is not known to us.  Thus, some experiments using different 
discount rates were conducted while maintaining all the other base case assumptions.  
These results are reported in Figure 3 and Table 6.  The relatively attractive nature of 
either alternative proposed contract disappears as interest rates increase.4  Thus, the 
contract is favored at low interest rates while current law is favored at high rates, below 
about 12%, while the proposed contract with the windfall tax is favored until about the 
discount rate reaches about 20%. 
 
This result reflects the shift of revenue to the future under the contract relative to 
current law.  Several factors in the contract reduce Mongolia’s revenue in the early 
years including elimination of the windfall tax,  longer loss carry forwards, the 
investment tax credit and  the need to finance the investment.  More revenue accrues in 
later years because of equity participation. Thus, the net effect of this tradeoff depends 
on the discount rate applied. 
 
The contract becomes unattractive relative to current law for Mongolia at 
discount rates in excess of about 12%., (and about 20% for the contract with the 
Windfall Tax).  Thus, it is important to ask whether these rates are too high (or too low) 
adjusted for risk.  One answer is indicated by stock market returns.  An estimate of the 
expected returns to Rio Tinto and Ivanhoe are 20.90% and 22.46% respectively.5  This 
compares to an average 14.62% return for international markets on average for the past 
five years.  The difference is simply an indicator that mining is risky relative to most 
economic investments and that investors require higher returns in order to bear that 
risk.  That is, if the estimate is correct then if either company accepted a project with a 
                                                
4 The fact that the values for the contract begin to increase is not relevant because the 
rate of change for the contract is always less than the rate of change for current law for 
all feasible outcomes.  By feasible, we mean having positive present values.  The 
present value of the project becomes negative at interest rates above about 40%. 
5 These values were estimated using what is known as the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM).  World returns, measured by the Standard and Poor’s 1200 International index 
have been 14.62% over the past 5 years.  A risk free rate may be the US 30 day 
Treasury Bill rate, currently at 4.7%.  The measure of relative stock price volatility 
(known as “beta” in the literature) has been estimated to be 1.633 for Rio Tinto and 1.79 
for Ivanhoe.  These are nominal returns and are not adjusted for personal income taxes, 
so are tax inclusive.  Inflation adjustments would reduce the value to about 19% given 
dollar inflation. 
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present value less than zero when discounted at about 20%, nominal, would experience 
a fall in stock prices, other things equal.6 
 
There are reasons to believe that Mongolia’s ability to bear risk is lower relative 
to the equity owners of either mining company for a number of reasons: 
 
1. Mongolia has only two million people, 
 
2. Mongolia’s economy is not as diversified as the world capital market, 
 
3. The cost of diversification may be higher for Mongolia relative to equity 
holders of mining companies who have relatively cheap access to a variety of 
financial instruments to diversify their risks, and 
 
4. Mongolia is relatively poor. 
 
These and other factors may indicate that Mongolia’s cost of risk bearing is at least as 
high as that of the enterprises.  Thus, it is important that  the government clearly 
articulate the reasons for undertaking additional risks (via equity ownership and having 
a domestic smelter) as well as explaining how these increased risks will be 
accommodated before a decision can be made about the relative merits of the proposed 
contract. 
 
 
                                               
6The cost of risk bearing for the mining firms might be even higher for projects in 
Mongolia relative to projects in countries like Australia and Canada because of 
differential political risks.  
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VI. Summary 
This presentation has been illustrative and should be refined.  The results, however, 
are suggestive of the types of issues that should be raised during the public debate 
about the merits of the proposed contract.  The Hural and Mongolians in general should 
request a number of things before discussing the proposals.  The requests should 
include: 
a. Any numerical and financial analyses performed by the government, 
b. Estimates of operating costs, sales contracts and other information 
necessary to construct reasonable estimates of cash flows, and 
c. Technical details  about how particular values will be computed 
(dividends, royalties, and other items noted in Table 2). 
Finally, Mongolians need to examine the four separate aspects of the project 
from a risk and return perspective.  The four aspects are: 
a. Mongolia owns the asset in the ground and needs to get a 
competitive return from owning that asset. 
b. Mongolia is a tax collector and taxes will become more dependent 
on mining unless steps are taken to diversify the government’s 
revenue base. 
c. Mongolia is considering making an equity investment in the mine’s 
plant and equipment in addition to owning the reserves.   
d. Mongolia has had an explicit policy of inducing the construction of a 
smelter via the windfall export tax, a facility that might be 
economically inefficient. 
It is true that owning some equity in the mine and having a smelter domestically 
will increase the proportion of the world price captured by Mongolia.  The point, 
however, is that the price varies significantly and thus Mongolia’s returns will vary more 
the greater the investment in mining equipment and downstream processes.  In 
addition, such lack of diversification is costly because Mongolian must use funds to 
purchase equity and perhaps to subsidize a smelter that cannot be used for other 
purposes which might create even greater employment, economic gains and overall 
stability.  It is possible to analyze each of the four elements joint and independently to 
obtain indicators of the risk and rewards from such an extensive commitment of 
domestic resources for one sector.  Such an analysis should be performed before the 
Hural can make an informed decision. 
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At this point, information sufficient to make informed comparisons and decisions 
is not available.  Thus, it is not possible to determine whether the proposed contract, as 
structured, is in Mongolia’s long term interest.   
 
OPEN SOCIETY FORUM 
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Table 1 
Comparison of Current Law with Proposed Contract 
Instrument Current Law Proposed Contract 
 
Royalty 
 
5.0 of sales value of products sold, shipped or used.  
 
 
5.0 of sales value of products sold, shipped or used.7 
 
Profits Tax 
 
Rates:  10 percent if the annual taxable income was between 
            0-3.0 billion tugrugs 
 
       300 million tugrugs plus 25 percent on taxable income  
      in excess of the balance exceeding the 3.0 billion  
 
Investment Tax Credit:  Mining is not a sector for which a  
                                      investment tax credit is provided 
 
 
Loss Carry Forward:  3 years limited to 50% of taxable 
                                   income each year applied. 
 
 
 
Rates:  10 percent if the annual taxable income was between  
            0-3.0 billion tugrugs 
 
       300 million tugrugs plus 25 percent on taxable  
         income in excess of the balance exceeding the 3.0 billion  
 
Investment Tax Credit:  Available for Initial Investment 
 
 
 
Loss Carry Forward:  5 years limited to 50% of taxable income 
                                  each year applied. 
Windfall 
Profits Tax 
68% of positive difference between price and 2600 $US per 
ton plus smelting and refinement costs for exported copper 
concentrate 
 
 and 
 
68% of positive difference between price and 500 $US per 
ounce for gold/ 
 
Exempt 
                                               
7 The wording in the contract differs from the wording the law.  The differences may be due to translation.  Thus, conditions, terms and application 
are assumed to be the same for current purposes.  This assumption may not be correct and should be verified.  This assumption will be 
maintained for all provisions unless otherwise noted. 
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Instrument Current Law Proposed Contract 
 
 
 
Border 
Withholding 
Taxes 
20% on dividends unless modified by treaty 
5%  for dividends to Canada 
 
5% on interest unless modified by treaty 
 
5% on payments for technology 
Exempt if appropriately structured 
 
Interest, management fees, title fees and technical and mining 
costs paid by the Investor to Ivanhoe Mines Ltd., Rio Tinto and/or 
subsidiary companies located outside Mongolia’s are taxed  in 
accordance with the Double Taxation Agreement, ori if such a 
treaty does not exist, in accordance with the Law of Mongolia.  
Presumably the rate will be 5% 
Value 
Added Tax 
10%  (but there will be no VAT revenue from production of 
either concentrate or refined output if goods are exported) 
10%  (but there will be no VAT revenue from production of either 
concentrate or refined output if goods are exported) 
 
3% interest accrues on excess credits until such time as either tax 
offsets are complete or refunds are paid. 
Customs Applicable rates according to Schedule Exempt during construction and imposed at current rates during 
the post construction period 
Stabilization None unless agreed Complete for all taxes including but not limited to the listing of 
taxes in Articles 16 and 17 of the General Tax Law.  (excises, 
personal income tax, stamp fees, payments for water and mineral 
water, vehicle taxes, land payments and other taxes, charges or 
fees). 
 
Stability is asymmetric.  If taxes rise the investor is protected.  If 
taxes fall then the government must allow the investor the benefit 
of lower tax rates. 
 
For instance, expatriates and citizens of Mongolia pay personal 
income tax of 10% 
 
 
Government 
Equity 
Option for up to 34% government ownership provided in 
current law 
34% government ownership granted  on the date the contract 
becomes effective subject to an exemption from other 
requirements of  Article 5 of the Minerals Law (Article 5 provides 
for state ownership share and the floating of 10 percent of the 
entity on the Mongolian stock exchange.)  Government will have to 
satisfy the 34% share of all equity-financed investment costs after 
the agreement becomes effective. 
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Instrument Current Law Proposed Contract 
 
Government may borrow funds from the Investor in order to 
finance its share of the investment.  LIBOR plus 3.3% will be the 
interest charge.  All loans and interest will be paid by forgoing 
dividends until such time as the loan balance is zero. 
 
Management fee of 3 percent of all capital costs up to date of 
production; 6 percent of all capital and operating costs thereafter. 
 
Mongolia may not dispose of its shares in whole or in part without 
the express authorization of the other shareholders 
 
Mongolia is to have no management powers. 
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Table 2 
Assumptions for Current Illustration 
 
 
Item Assumption Potential Bias 
Mongolia’s Share 
1 Royalty 5% of Net Smelter Return High if transport cost and other 
processing costs are not 
included 
2 Net Smelter 
Return 
LME Price – 
 (300 +.09(LME Price of Copper)) 
per ton 
 
Low because gold price is not 
used. 
 
High if other charges are 
included (transport from 
smelter, penalties, etc.) 
3 Inflation 0% Low – Mongolia gains with 
inflation because the income 
tax system and the windfall tax 
are not adjusted for inflation. 
4 Interest 
Rates 
Same rate used for debt and 
return to equity.  Interest rates 
vary by case. 
Uncertain – depends on debt 
interest rates relative to equity 
cost of capital 
5 Fiscal 
Regime 
As described in Table 1  
6 Production As described in proposed contract  
7 Investment 
Costs 
As described in Proposed Contract  
8 Operating  
Cost 
As described in Ivanhoe’s 
Executive Summary 
 
9 Dividends Defined to be After Tax Income 
less repayments of debt.  Return 
of capital is defined as tax 
depreciation.  (That is, it is 
necessary to separate repayment 
of initial capital form “dividends”.  
Distributions can be made to 
shareholders when accumulated 
after tax profits are zero [or 
negative].  These payments are 
defined to be repayments of equity 
capital investment) 
Low if dividends are defined to 
be any payment to 
shareholders other than a 
liquidating distribution or by 
some other rule. 
10 Amortization 
of Corporate 
Debt 
Interest paid in year accrued with 
a balloon payment in the last year 
of the project 
Uncertain – If debt is retired 
earlier then income taxes will 
be higher earlier in the 
production period.  Dividends 
will be lower earlier in the 
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Item Assumption Potential Bias 
Mongolia’s Share 
production period, however, 
because cash must be used to 
amortize the debt. 
11 Amortization 
of Debt to 
Finance 
Mongolia’s 
34% 
Mongolia forgo dividends and 
capital repayments until loan 
balance in paid 
Uncertain --- Depends on the 
amortization schedule of 
Government Debt attributed to 
the project and the 
amortization schedule 
employed. 
12 Treatment of 
Intangibles 
Exploration and Production 
preproduction expenses amortized 
over five years on a straight line 
basis 
High --- Treatment of 
intangibles is not clear in tax 
law (at least to me).  
Exploration expenses are 
amortized over five years but 
the treatment of other non-
physical asset preproduction 
expenses is not well defined. 
13 Domestic 
Smelter 
Assume that the NPV of the 
Smelter is zero. 
 
Smelter costs are assumed the 
same for domestic and foreign 
smelters. 
 
In effect it is assumed that there is 
no domestic value added from the 
smelter in Mongolia. 
 
High --- The NPV of the 
smelter are competitive prices 
is probably less than zero.   
 
Otherwise the company would 
not have to be induced, via the 
windfall profits tax, to invest in 
the smelter. 
 
 
14 Electricity Costs are embedded in production 
costs.  Thus, the price is assumed 
invariant to source of electricity 
 
Assume that NPV of electricity 
plant, if built is zero. 
High -- The assumption about 
pricing implies there are no 
domestic subsidies to 
electricity production.   
15 Management 
Fees 
As stated in Shareholder 
Agreement for Proposed Contract 
 
Zero for Current Law 
 
 
 
High for analysis with current 
law. 
16 Exchange 
Rates 
Proportion of costs that will be 
paid in domestic currency is not 
known.  Thus, it was assumed that 
the relative exchange will not 
change during the course of the 
Unknown --- Bias depends on 
whether the US Dollar 
appreciates or depreciates 
relative to the Tugrug. 
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Item Assumption Potential Bias 
Mongolia’s Share 
project 
17 Debt 
Structure of 
Domestic 
Entity 
If the domestic entity borrows 
funds then the amount of equity 
finance falls in proportion to equity 
participation for the government 
and the foreign investor. 
 
18 Concentrate 
Production 
2% of Mine Output based on 
Ivanhoe’s Executive Summary 
 
 
27 July 2007 
Open Society Forum 17
 
Table 3 
Base Case Result 
 
    Internal Shares of 
  Net Present Rate of 
Net 
Present 
  Value Return Value 
Total Project          9,495.00  40.53%   
Current Law  
Investor          4,840.00  40.91% 50.97% 
Mongolia          4,655.00  NA 49.03% 
        
Proposed Contract  
Investor          4,823.00  54.87% 50.80% 
Mongolia          4,672.00  60.09% 49.20% 
        
Proposed Contract With Windfall Tax  
Investor          4,157.00  42.22% 43.78% 
Mongolia          5,338.00  69.11% 56.22% 
 
Assumptions:  See text. 
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Table 4 
Mongolia’s Share of Present Value When Prices Change 
(Shares Reported as Percentages) 
 
 
    Proposed   
Copper Current Contract Proposed 
Price Law with WPT Contract 
1.00 45.94% 50.18% 50.18% 
1.50 40.14% 50.84% 50.84% 
2.00 49.03% 56.22% 49.20% 
2.50 63.44% 63.41% 46.51% 
3.00 72.27% 67.73% 44.84% 
3.50 78.21% 70.54% 43.68% 
 
Table 5 
Mongolia’s Share of Present Value When Debt Structure Changes 
(Shares Reported as Percentages) 
 
 
    Proposed   
Percentage Current Contract Proposed 
of Debt Law with WPT Contract 
0.00% 51.17% 57.60% 50.63% 
25.00% 50.09% 56.92% 49.91% 
50.00% 49.03% 56.22% 49.20% 
75.00% 47.98% 55.59% 47.98% 
100.00% 46.93% 54.90% 47.84% 
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Table 6 
Mongolia’s Share of Present Value When Discount Rate Changes 
(Shares Reported as Percentages) 
 
    Proposed   
Discount Current Contract Proposed 
Rate Law with WPT Contract 
0.00% 46.81% 57.70% 51.70% 
2.50% 46.79% 57.11% 51.02% 
5.00% 47.13% 56.65% 50.34% 
7.50% 47.86% 56.35% 49.73% 
10.00% 49.03% 56.22% 49.20% 
12.50% 50.70% 56.35% 48.77% 
15.00% 52.98% 56.79% 48.49% 
17.50% 56.01% 57.58% 48.39% 
20.00% 59.99% 58.66% 48.51% 
22.50% 65.31% 60.23% 48.90% 
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